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On 20 February 2002 the Civil Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Lithuania, consisting of judges Česlovas
Jokūbauskas (chairman of the chamber), Artūras
Driukas (judge rapporteur) and Egidijus Laužikas, on the
basis of the appeal in cassation of the defendant, AB
Lietuva taupomasis bankas, which called for the review
of the decision of 13 June 2001 of the chamber of judges
of the civil division of Vilnius regional court, which was
adopted pursuant to the action for damages brought by
Mr. Z.S., adopted the decision which is summarized
below.
Facts 
On 20 August 1999 Mr. Z.S. and AB Lietuva taupomasis
bankas signed a contract regarding the issuing and
servicing of a Maestro payment card. On 26 and 27
August 1999, Mr. Z.S. deposited LTL 49,000 (forty nine
thousand litas, approximately €14,190) in cash to his
account connected to the payment card. On 29 August
1999 almost all the money (LTL 48,423.52) was
withdrawn from various ATM machines in Poland. Mr.
Z.S. claimed that he did not withdraw the money and
demanded that the bank compensate him for the sums
that were the withdrawn. The bank refused to do so,
and Mr. Z.S. initiated legal action, claiming that the
bank’s refusal to compensate him for the withdrawal of
the money caused him damage.
The procedural history 
On 26 March 2001 Vilnius 2nd district court dismissed
the claim by Mr. Z.S. claim for damages on the basis of
absence of either fault or lack of care or negligence on
the part of the bank or its employees. Mr. Z.S. appealed,
and on 13 June 2001 a chamber of judges of the civil
division of Vilnius regional court upheld the appeal. The
Vilnius regional court established that first, it is
impossible to withdraw money only with a PIN (without
the card) and second, that the defendant failed to prove
that the original card was used together with PIN for the
withdrawal of the money.
In cassation, the bank appealed the decision of the
Vilnius regional court on the following grounds:
1. the court transferred the burden of proof to the
defendant unduly;
2. the court was incorrect in assessing the role of the
PIN;
3. the court erred in making assumptions on the facts
of the case because it was not proven that a
forged card was used for withdrawals;
4. the court’s conclusion that such payment cards are
unduly protected from forgery due to lack of an in-
built micro chip does not correspond to the
requirements applicable within the EU;
5. the activities of the claimant and his failure to act,
or both the activities of the claimant and his failure
to act (Mr. Z.S. reported the missing amounts ten
days after the withdrawals took place; it was
alleged that Mr. Z.S. reported the withdrawals to
the bank after the video records of the actual
withdrawals were erased) did not fulfil the general
criteria of fairness, reasonableness and honesty,
as established by the Lithuanian Civil Code.
Main issues 
Civil liability of the bank 
The Supreme Court ruled that the banks, being
specialized financial institutions, are obliged to act
prudently and carefully in their professional activities,
and such obligation results in the banks’ general
obligation to ensure the reliability, effectiveness and
safety of their activities. The court reiterated that, in
accordance with the article 2(1) of the Law on
commercial banks of the Republic of Lithuania, a bank is
obliged to assume the risks and liability which stem
from the nature of the bank’s services. Therefore, the
assumption of the risks and liability means that the
bank bears the burden of risk of possible damages
(losses) that may occur due to the insufficient reliability,
effectiveness and safety of the bank’s activities.
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The court concluded that the civil liability of a bank
arises not only when it commits any unlawful actions,
which violate the statutory or contractual obligations of
a bank, but also when a bank fails to fulfil its general
duty to ensure that the activities of the bank are
sufficiently reliable, effective and safe enough to
eliminate the risk of possible damages (losses). The
court reiterated that the position regarding the liability
and general responsibility to ensure the reliability,
effectiveness and safety of the activities of a bank
constitutes the consistent practice of the Supreme Court
of Lithuania, (see the decision of the Supreme Court in
case No. 3K-3-1345/2000 UAB ‘Vileka’ v AB bankas
‘Snoras’ and case Nr. 3K-3-645/2001 A. T. v AB bankas
‘Snoras’).
The court stated that the issuing and servicing of the
electronic payment cards constitutes a part of the
professional activity of the bank. Therefore, a bank,
which issues an electronic payment card, is obliged to
ensure the reliable, effective and safe functioning of its
electronic payment system. By operating systems that
are insufficiently safe and do not preclude the use of
forged electronic payment cards, as well as systems
that do not ensure the protection of the data required
for the formation of payment orders, the bank assumes
the risks stemming from the operation of such an
insecure system. The court concluded that a bank may
eliminate its liability fully or in part if it proves that it
has fulfilled the general duty to ensure the protection
from forgery or if it proves that the damages arose
because of fault of a cardholder, or due to unforeseen
events occurring beyond the control of the bank.
The burden of proof 
The court reiterated that the burden of proof in civil
procedure is distributed in accordance with the general
presumption of good faith of both parties of the civil
transaction and depending on each party’s capacity to
prove their claims. The court also reiterated that banks
are generally responsible for the administration of
electronic payment systems and, therefore, banks are
responsible for the security of these systems; banks are
obliged to act prudently and carefully.
The court stated that a cardholder cannot shape or
influence in any way the safety of the bank’s electronic
payment system. Therefore, it is for the bank to prove
that the system’s safety measures were neutralized and
that the conditions that are necessary for the formation
of the payment order were abused because the
customer was at fault, whereas the cardholder is not in
a position to prove the lack of fault on his part. The
court concluded that in order to establish that all of the
necessary conditions were in place to initiate payment,
and the security measures were neutralized with the
customer’s knowledge or due to the customer’s
negligence, it is necessary for the bank to prove the
specific actions of the cardholder.
Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to the
customer only where it is established that the security
measures could only be neutralized with the customer’s
knowledge or due to the customer’s negligence.
Consequently, where the customer fails to prove the
absence of fault, the liability of the bank may be
excluded fully or in part, depending on the degree of
fault of the customer.
The role of the PIN
The court stated that in cases where the electronic
signature (the PIN) is used during the payment
transaction, the distribution of the burden of proof
should be performed taking into consideration the level
of security of such an electronic signature.
In accordance with article 8(1) of the Law on electronic
signature of the Republic of Lithuania, the electronic
signature has the same legal force as a hand-written
signature in paper documents and is admissible as
evidence in court only when the signature used is a
secure electronic signature created with secure
signature creation equipment and based on a valid
qualified certificate created in accordance with the
requirements of the Law on electronic signature.
If it could be established that, due to the level of
security of the signature (PIN), it is impossible to
reproduce it without the holder’s knowledge or
negligence, then the fact that the signature (PIN) was
used may be used as evidence of the cardholder’s
knowledge or negligence.
If it could be established that, due to the level of
security of the signature (PIN), it is possible to
reproduce it without the cardholder’s knowledge or
negligence, then the fact of the use of the signature
(PIN) is not a sufficient proof of the cardholder’s
knowledge or negligence.
Since the fact of use of the signature (PIN) is not a
sufficient proof of the cardholder’s knowledge or
negligence, it is for the issuer of the card to prove that
the cardholder either knew the card was used (and
probably contributed to it), or was negligent in that they
compromised the security of the card.
The burden of proof may only be transferred to the
cardholder where the original PIN was used, which in
accordance with the present level of equipment and in
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accordance with the requirements as to the formation
and usage of such a signature, could not have been
reproduced without the holder’s knowledge or
negligence.
Therefore, should a dispute regarding the evidentiary
value of the use of the PIN (a form of electronic
signature) arise between a bank and a cardholder, the
bank must provide evidence of specific actions (or
inaction) of the cardholder, which goes to prove that the
use of the PIN took place with the cardholder’s
knowledge or due to the customer’s negligence.
Contractual limitation of liability
The court noted that the contract concluded between
Mr. Z.S. and the bank regarding the issuing and
servicing of a Maestro payment card provided that
transactions confirmed by entering the PIN are
considered appropriately authenticated and the
customer is responsible for the consequences of such
transactions. The court concluded that these provisions
bestow greater importance to the PIN than the payment
card itself. The court reasoned that these provisions of
the contract establish the presumptions that, on the one
hand, every transaction confirmed by entering the PIN is
lawful and, on the other hand, these provisions
establish the limitation of the bank’s liability for the
possible losses of the customer caused by such
transactions.
The court also noted that the contract in question is
concluded on the basis of the bank’s standard form,
which terms the customer (consumer) was not able to
negotiate. The court concluded that the transfer of risk
of loss which may be incurred due to the use of the
payment card, as well as the transfer of the burden of
proof of the lawfulness of payment orders successfully
effected, and the transfer of the bank’s statutory liability
to the customer (consumer) by the means of standard
contractual clauses, is groundless.
The court established that the contract regarding the
issuing and servicing of a Maestro payment card
unfairly negates the presumption of the professional
liability of the bank, and unlawfully limits and abolishes
the civil liability of the bank for damages to the
customer’s (consumer’s) property incurred due to the
activities of the bank. The court concluded that there
are no grounds to rely on those provisions of the
contract regarding the issuing and servicing of a
payment card which violate the statutory principles of a
banks’ civil liability and burden of proof in cases where
the issues of a banks’ civil liability for the damages
incurred by the customers due to the banks’
professional activity are considered.
Decision of the court 
The court established that both the court of first
instance and the appeal court did not comply with the
rules of distribution of burden of proof and did not
analyze all the relevant factual circumstances of the
case.
The court provided a list of circumstances related to
the card that was used, the PIN and the conditions of
payments, as well as other associated circumstances,
which were not sufficiently established by the lower
courts.
The court concluded that the case was decided
incorrectly and both judgments cannot be considered
reasonable and valid.
The Supreme Court decided:
1. To annul the decision adopted on 13 June 2001 by
the chamber of judges of Civil cases division of
Vilnius regional court;
2. To annul the decision, adopted on 26 March, 2001
by the Vilnius district 2nd court; and
3. To transfer the case to Vilnius district 2nd court for
retrial on the merits.
Commentary
The ruling of the Supreme Court clarifies the main
issues of the value that a PIN and a payment card
entails, as well as the distribution of burden of proof in
case of a dispute between the issuing bank and the
customer. In the long term, this judgment might mean
that the banks will consider the application of measures
that will strengthen the security of their payment
systems.
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